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Corporate Transparency and the First Amendment: 
Compelled Disclosures in the Wake of National 
Association of Manufacturers v. SEC 
Imagine you have purchased a brand new smartphone. And, as an 
especially savvy and politically cognizant consumer, you are interested in 
finding out where your new smartphone comes from. Given news coverage 
regarding unethically sourced products—from child labor in China to the 
rise of the fair trade coffee movement in South America—your concern is 
not novel.1 
It would probably be valuable to know that the core components that go 
into constructing electronics like your new smartphone—tungsten, tin, gold, 
and tantalum—are often sourced from the war-torn region of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (the “DRC”).2 You might also be 
interested to know that armed militias often monopolize the mines that 
produce these minerals so they can sell minerals to U.S. companies and 
finance their civil war, which has now been raging for more than two 
decades.3 The war that they are financing just so happens to be one of the 
bloodiest conflicts in world history, characterized by extreme levels of 
gender-specific violence.4 Unfortunately, browsing the website of your new 
smartphone’s manufacturer, you find no information on the sources of their 
electronics. In fact, a recent circuit court decision has affirmatively 
protected the rights of companies like your smartphone manufacturer to 
omit this information from their websites under the First Amendment.5  
Would you still purchase the same smartphone if you knew that, just by 
purchasing its core components, you could be indirectly funding a 
humanitarian crisis? If this information would alter your purchasing 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See, e.g., David Barboza, Despite a Pledge by Samsung, Child Labor Proves 
Resilient, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/11/business/ 
international/children-found-working-at-samsung-supplier-in-china.html; Alison Benjamin, 
Fair Dunk'em, GUARDIAN (Feb. 9, 2006), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2006/ 
feb/09/food.fairtrade. 
 2. See What Are Conflict Minerals?, SOURCE INTELLIGENCE, http://www.source 
intelligence.com/what-are-conflict-minerals/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2017). 
 3. See Eastern Congo, ENOUGH PROJECT, http://www.enoughproject.org/conflicts/ 
eastern_congo (last visited Apr. 15, 2017).  
 4. See id. 
 5. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC (NAM III), 800 F.3d 518, 519–24 (D.C. Cir. 2015), 
reh’g en banc denied, No. 13-5252 (Nov. 9, 2015).  
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decisions, you might find the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit’s 
decision in National Ass’n of Manufacturers v. Securities Exchange 
Commission (“NAM III”) unsettling. 
In August 2015, a panel of three judges on the D.C. Circuit Court in 
NAM III decided that the Securities Exchange Commission (the “SEC”)’s 
rule requiring companies to publish whether their minerals have been found 
to be “DRC conflict free” on their websites violated the First Amendment 
rights of corporations.6 The SEC promulgated this rule following the 
express mandate of section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act.7 Although 
compelled commercial disclosures have long been an accepted and even 
favored method of regulation, recent First Amendment challenges have cast 
doubt upon how heavily the government may rely on this method to 
encourage corporate transparency in publicly traded U.S. companies.8 
Depending on the type of compelled speech at issue, courts have applied 
varying levels of scrutiny to cases challenging the constitutionality of 
compelled disclosures. Speech compelled for purposes of avoiding 
consumer deception and disclosures of purely factual information enjoy a 
relatively low level of scrutiny, subject only to a rational basis inquiry. 
However, the D.C. Circuit Court found that conflict minerals disclosures 
fall outside this realm of lax scrutiny; the court instead applied a more 
exacting level of scrutiny to strike down these disclosures.9  
To put it simply, the D.C. Circuit Court got it wrong. The court 
unnecessarily deviated from its own precedent—decided scarcely over a 
year before NAM III—in which it extended the application of rational basis 
scrutiny to a wider array of cases, under the justification that a company’s 
constitutional interest in avoiding government-compelled disclosure of 
purely factual and uncontroversial information is minimal.10 The court 
improperly narrowed the scope of that prior decision in holding that rational 
basis scrutiny applies only to advertising material, it misplaced reliance on 
finding proof that the SEC’s regulation would in fact prove efficacious in 
alleviating the conflict in the DRC, and it found that the disclosures 
                                                                                                                 
 6. Id. 
 7. Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pts. 240, 249, & 249b); see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act § 1502, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A) (2012). 
 8. See Jennifer M. Keighley, Can You Handle the Truth? Compelled Commercial 
Speech and the First Amendment, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 539, 541–43 (2012).  
 9. NAM III, 800 F.3d at 521–24. 
 10. See Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. (AMI), 760 F.3d 18, 22-23 (D.C. Cir. 
2014).  
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required did not convey purely factual information. With its decision, the 
D.C. Circuit overlooked the negative consequences of its decision on 
consumers, U.S. policy, and the state of compelled commercial disclosures 
as a whole. Although the SEC recently decided not to pursue further appeal 
of the NAM III decision,11 this case widens the circuit split regarding the 
level of scrutiny that applies to government-compelled disclosures, and its 
missteps ought to be considered when these issues appear before sister 
circuit courts. 
Consumers deserve to be able to make informed decisions with regard to 
the products they purchase. In light of the extreme brutality in the DRC and 
the urgency with which ameliorating steps must be taken, it is imperative 
that the U.S. government be afforded the ability to use the SEC’s disclosure 
regime to encourage corporate transparency.  
This Note proceeds as follows: Part I provides the factual background 
behind the conflict minerals crisis in the DRC and the enactment of section 
1502 and the SEC’s Conflict Minerals Rule. Part II traces compelled 
commercial speech law prior to the D.C. Circuit Court’s decision. Part III 
discusses the litigation surrounding the National Association of 
Manufacturers’ constitutional challenge to section 1502 and the D.C. 
Circuit Court’s ultimate decision that requiring companies to publish 
whether or not their conflict minerals have been found to be “DRC conflict 
free” on their websites violates the First Amendment rights of corporations. 
Finally, Part IV emphasizes the broad impact of the D.C. Circuit Court’s 
decision and highlights the major flaws in the majority’s unsound ruling 
striking down the Conflict Minerals Rule.  
I. Introduction to the Conflict Minerals Crisis in the DRC 
and Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act 
A. The DRC Civil War and Conflict Minerals Crisis 
The DRC has never been a stranger to civil war and corruption. Armed 
groups fighting in the region are eager to capture the vast mineral wealth of 
the country.12 However, the most recent conflict, spurred by the 1997 
incursion of Rwandan militias aimed at eradicating extremist Hutu forces, 
has become the center of what some observers have called “Africa’s world 
                                                                                                                 
 11. Cory Hester, SEC Accepts Ruling That Part of Conflicts Minerals Rule Violates 
Free Speech, WESTLAW CAP. MKTS. DAILY BRIEFING (Apr. 13, 2016), 2016 WL 1442370. 
 12. DR Congo Country Profile, BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
13283212 (last updated Apr. 11, 2017).  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
522 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:519 
 
 
war.”13 This war has become the world’s deadliest conflict since World 
War II.14 It has produced 5.4 million deaths, a death toll as catastrophic as 
the U.S. Civil War, the Vietnam War, and the Korean War, combined.15 
Beyond mere death toll, however, this conflict has spawned some of the 
most notorious human rights atrocities the world has ever seen.16 The 
conflict in the DRC is characterized by extreme levels of violence, 
particularly sexual and gender-based violence, which has risen to the level 
of an extreme humanitarian crisis in the region.17 
“Conflict minerals,” including tantalum, tin, gold, and tungsten,18 are at 
the center of the DRC crisis. Militant groups have capitalized upon the 
natural resource-rich nature of the region, largely financing themselves by 
taking control of local mines and exploiting the mineral trade.19 After these 
minerals are extracted from the mines, they can be sold through several 
intermediaries before ultimately being purchased by large, multinational 
companies.20 U.S. companies typically purchase conflict minerals for use in 
manufacturing various products, including electronics, automobiles, and 
sports equipment.21 Companies in the mineral extraction industry indirectly 
finance these armed groups by purchasing minerals from militant-controlled 
mines.22 
B. Passage of Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act and the Conflict 
Minerals Rule 
The United States has consistently made alleviating the crisis in the DRC 
a high priority, and in doing so has recognized the necessity for U.S. 
companies conducting business operations in the DRC region to exercise 
proper due diligence in determining the supply and chain of custody of 
                                                                                                                 
 13. Id.  
 14. Democratic Republic of the Congo Relief, Security, and Democracy Promotion Act 
of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-456, § 101(7), 120 Stat. 3384, 3385; DR Congo Country Profile, 
supra note 12. 
 15. What Are Conflict Minerals?, supra note 2. 
 16. Id. 
 17. MICHAEL V. SEITZINGER & KATHLEEN ANN RUANE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 
43639, CONFLICT MINERALS AND RESOURCE EXTRACTION: DODD-FRANK, SEC REGULATIONS, 
AND LEGAL CHALLENGES 1 (2015).  
 18. 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249(b) (2015). 
 19. Conflict Minerals, RAISE HOPE FOR CONGO, http://www.raisehopeforcongo.org/ 
content/conflict-minerals (last visited Apr. 15, 2017). 
 20. See id. 
 21. What Are Conflict Minerals?, supra note 2.  
 22. Conflict Minerals, supra note 19. 
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conflict minerals.23 In 2006, Congress enacted the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo Relief, Security, and Democracy Promotion Act of 2006, 
pledging “to make all efforts to ensure that the Government of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo . . . is committed to responsible and 
transparent management of natural resources across the country.”24  
In order to further facilitate this goal of transparency in the mineral 
extraction industry, Congress added section 1502 to the Dodd-Frank Act.25 
Section 1502 mandates that the SEC promulgate rules requiring publicly 
traded companies to conduct due diligence in determining the origins of 
their minerals and to submit reports to the SEC regarding whether those 
minerals have been determined to be “DRC conflict free.”26 After multiple 
rounds of soliciting commentary and developing proposed rules, the SEC 
adopted its final rule on August 22, 2012 (the “Conflict Minerals Rule,” or, 
the “Rule”).27  
The Conflict Minerals Rule outlines a three-step process: First, the 
company must decide if it is covered by the Rule.28 The Rule only applies 
to publicly traded companies for which conflict minerals are necessary to 
the functionality or production of a product manufactured or contracted to 
be manufactured by that company.29 If the company is covered by the Rule, 
the second step requires the company to conduct a reasonable country of 
origin inquiry regarding their minerals.30 The third and final step depends 
on the results of the county or origin inquiry. If the results of this inquiry 
reveal that the company either knows or has reason to believe that its 
minerals originated in the DRC or an adjoining country, the company must 
exercise due diligence in determining the source and chain of custody of 
their conflict minerals.31 If, after due diligence, the company determines 
that its minerals did not originate in the covered countries, it still must 
                                                                                                                 
 23. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, Statement Concerning Implementation of 
Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Legislation Concerning Conflict Minerals Due Diligence 
(July 15, 2011), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/168851.pdf.  
 24. Democratic Republic of the Congo Relief, Security, and Democracy Promotion Act 
of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-456, § 102(8), 120 Stat. 3384, 3386. 
 25. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1502, 15 
U.S.C. § 78m(p) (2012). 
 26. Id. 
 27. See Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,277–79, 56,365 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, & 249b).  
 28. See id. at 56,285, 56,287.  
 29. Id. at 56,287–98. 
 30. Id. at 56,310–16. 
 31. Id. at 56,316–17, 56,320-21.  
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prepare and submit a form to the SEC describing its due diligence efforts.32 
The company may then refer to those minerals as “DRC conflict free.”33 If, 
on the other hand, the company reveals that its minerals did originate in the 
covered countries (or it cannot determine whether its minerals originated in 
the covered countries), the company must prepare and submit a Conflict 
Minerals Report to the SEC.34 Those minerals must be referred to as having 
“not been found to be 'DRC conflict free.'”35  
Once the three-step process is complete, the Conflict Minerals Rule 
requires that companies publish their reports on their public websites.36 
There is, however, no requirement that the information be placed on any 
physical labeling of the product itself.37 
The National Association of Manufacturers and other organizations 
challenged section 1502 and the Conflicts Mineral Rule alleging, among 
other things, that the required publishing of SEC disclosures on company 
websites constitutes unconstitutionally compelled corporate speech.38 
II. Compelled Commercial Speech  
In order to better understand the legal landscape in which section 1502 
and the Conflict Minerals Rule operate, a brief overview of compelled 
commercial speech is necessary. Government-compelled speech is a 
pervasive component of U.S. consumer culture. One can find required 
disclosures on nearly any product, from cigarettes and medications to 
automobiles and electronics. Further, publicly traded companies are 
required to make an expansive host of disclosures to the SEC regarding 
various elements of their products.39 However, while there has been a great 
deal of analysis broadly pronouncing the right of private individuals to be 
free from compelled speech, judicial guidance on the matter of compelled 
speech in the commercial realm is scant.40 
In 1976, the Supreme Court first announced the right of commercial 
speech to enjoy First Amendment protection in its Virginia State Board of 
                                                                                                                 
 32. Id. at 56,313. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 56,281. 
 36. Id. at 56,315–16. 
 37. See id. at 56,323. 
 38. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC (NAM II), 748 F.3d 359, 362–65 (D.C. Cir. 2014), 
overruled by AMI, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014).  
 39. NAM III, 800 F.3d 518, 531 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Srinivasan, J., dissenting). 
 40. Keighly, supra note 8, at 541.  
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Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. decision.41 In doing 
so, the Court recognized that the “consumer's interest in the free flow of 
commercial information . . . may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his 
interest in the day's most urgent political debate.”42 However, even though 
the Court granted First Amendment protection to commercial speech, the 
Court was careful to note that regulations of commercial speech may be 
afforded a “different degree of protection,” based on the need to “insure 
that the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information is 
unimpaired.”43  
The first case to firmly illustrate the degree of protection afforded to 
commercial speech was Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public 
Service Commission of New York.44 In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court 
provided a four-part test for analyzing government regulations of 
commercial speech: (1) the speech must concern lawful activity and must 
not be misleading, (2) the asserted governmental interest must be 
substantial, (3) the regulation must directly advance the governmental 
interest asserted, and (4) the regulation must not be more extensive than is 
necessary to serve the interest.45 Courts generally accept that this test 
represents a type of intermediate scrutiny applied in the context of 
commercial speech regulations.46 
Following Central Hudson, the Supreme Court in Zauderer v. Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio relaxed the requirements 
for regulations on compelled commercial speech.47 In Zauderer, the Court 
applied a rational basis standard for compelled commercial speech, noting 
that while the commercial speech is still afforded First Amendment 
protections, that protection is lesser than what is required for what the Court 
deems “noncommercial speech.”48 The Zauderer Court stated that “an 
advertiser's rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure 
requirements are reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing 
deception of consumers.”49 The Court further emphasized that an 
advertiser’s “constitutionally protected interest in not providing any 
                                                                                                                 
 41. 425 U.S. 748, 761-62 (1976).  
 42. Id. at 763. 
 43. Id. at 771 n.24. 
 44. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).  
 45. Id. at 566. 
 46. NAM II, 748 F.3d 359, 372 (D.C. Circuit 2014), overruled by AMI, 760 F.3d 18 
(D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 47. 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).  
 48. Id. at 637.  
 49. Id. at 651. 
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particular factual information in his advertising is minimal.”50 However, 
though Zauderer provided a relaxed approach to regulations of 
government-compelled commercial speech, the language of the case is less 
than clear as to the scope of this rational basis approach, including what 
“types” of compelled commercial speech trigger the Zauderer rational basis 
analysis.51 This remains an open question, and circuit courts across the 
country use very different methods of attempting to answer it.52  
III. The National Association of Manufacturers Decisions 
Against the backdrop of this uncertain legal landscape surrounding 
government-compelled speech, the D.C. Circuit Court was tasked with 
considering a constitutional challenge to the Conflict Minerals Rule’s 
requirement that disclosures be posted on a company’s public website. 
A. Procedural History and the American Meat Institute Decision 
While this Note primarily concerns the D.C. Circuit Court’s August 2015 
ruling in NAM III, that decision is the culmination of a long and twisting 
history of constitutional challenges to the SEC’s Conflict Minerals Rule,53 
which highlights the uncertainty that plagues the realm of compelled 
disclosure regulation.  
Shortly after the SEC’s Conflict Minerals Rule took effect, the National 
Association of Manufacturers, alongside the Business Roundtable, and the 
United States Chamber of Commerce (collectively, “the Manufacturers”), 
filed suit in a D.C. District Court to challenge the constitutionality of the 
Conflict Minerals Rule’s directives.54 The Manufacturers alleged, among 
other things, that the statute and Rule violated the Constitution’s First 
Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech by requiring a company to 
publish on its own website that its products are “not DRC conflict free,” 
even when the company is simply unable to trace its supply chains to 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Id. 
 51. See Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 559 n.8 (6th 
Cir. 2012) (applying strict scrutiny when Zauderer is found inapplicable); Entm’t Software 
Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 652 (7th Cir. 2006) (applying strict scrutiny when video 
labeling requirements were found to be outside of the Zauderer exception). 
 52. Disc. Tobacco City, 674 F.3d at 559-60 n.8; Entm’t Software Ass’n, 469 F.3d at 652. 
 53. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC (NAM I), 956 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2013), rev’d 
in part, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014); NAM II, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014), overruled by 
AMI, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014); AMI, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014); NAM III, 800 F.3d 
518 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 54. See NAM I, 956 F. Supp. 2d at 46.  
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determine the minerals’ origins.55 The Manufacturers complained that this 
requirement forces a company to falsely associate itself with groups 
involved in human rights violations.56  
Importantly, although the Manufacturers challenged many aspects of the 
Conflict Minerals Rule, during the course of trial the Manufacturers 
confirmed that the only portion of the Rule they challenged under the First 
Amendment was the requirement that companies publish the conflict 
minerals sourcing information on their own websites.57 Thus, the 
companies essentially conceded that the Rule’s requirement that they 
conduct due diligence procedures in order to produce a disclosure report to 
the SEC was fully within the government’s authority to compel.58  
In response to the Manufacturer’s allegations, the district court held that 
the statute and the Conflict Minerals Rule withstood all of the constitutional 
challenges and did not violate First Amendment rights of companies.59 
Notably, this court refused to apply the relaxed Zauderer standard, 
interpreting it to only apply in cases of consumer deception.60 Instead, the 
district court applied the stricter Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny test, 
and still found that the Rule passed constitutional muster.61  
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the 
Conflict Minerals Rule did, in fact, violate the First Amendment rights of 
companies dealing in conflict minerals.62 The court of appeals agreed with 
the district court that the Zauderer test was not the appropriate standard of 
review.63 This time, however, the court invalidated the Rule under the third 
prong of the Central Hudson test, finding that the Rule was not narrowly 
tailored.64 The Rule failed this prong because, in the court’s eyes, the SEC 
did not prove that less restrictive means would fail in advancing the 
government interest of promoting peace and security in the DRC.65 The 
court proposed some means of accomplishing the interest of corporate 
transparency that it found less restrictive, including allowing the SEC to 
                                                                                                                 
 55. Id. at 53.  
 56. See id. at 73. 
 57. Id.  
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. at 81–82. 
 60. Id. at 76–77. 
 61. Id. at 78–80. 
 62. NAM II, 748 F.3d 359, 370–73 (D.C. Cir. 2014), overruled by AMI, 760 F.3d 18 
(D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 63. Id. at 372.  
 64. Id.  
 65. Id. at 372–73. 
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analyze the companies’ disclosure reports and compile its own, centralized 
list of which products have been found to be “DRC conflict free.”66 
Because the SEC had failed to provide sufficient evidence that such means 
would fail, the court struck down the Rule’s requirement that companies 
denote whether their conflict minerals are “DRC conflict free” on their own 
company websites as a First Amendment violation.67 
This was not the end of the road for the Conflict Minerals Rule, 
however. In his concurring opinion, Judge Srinivasan noted that a similarly 
situated case was pending before the D.C. Circuit Court, and suggested the 
NAM II court hold off in deciding whether the Zauderer standard could be 
extended to cover the SEC disclosures until that decision came out.68 That 
intervening decision was American Meat Institute v. U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (“AMI”).69  
AMI involved a First Amendment challenge to country-of-origin labeling 
requirements on meat products.70 The American Meat Institute challenged 
disclosures required on the packaging of meat products relating to where 
the animals used in the products were born and slaughtered.71 The purpose 
of these disclosures was to aid consumers in making informed decisions 
when purchasing meat products and was not related to curing alleged 
consumer deception.72 The AMI court recognized the extent of the 
confusion among the courts regarding the breadth of the Zauderer standard, 
and took the task of answering the question of “whether the principles 
articulated in Zauderer apply more broadly to factual and uncontroversial 
disclosures required to serve other government interests [than preventing 
consumer deception].”73  
The D.C. Circuit Court in AMI ultimately decided that “[t]he language 
with which Zauderer justified its approach, however, sweeps far more 
broadly than the interest in remedying deception.”74 The court was 
persuaded by the Zauderer reasoning that “the extension of First 
Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the 
value to consumers of the information such speech provides, [and thus, a 
                                                                                                                 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 373. 
 68. Id. at 373–75 (Srinivasan, J., concurring in part). 
 69. 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 70. Id. at 21. 
 71. AMI, 760 F.3d at 20–21; see 7 U.S.C. § 1638a (2012). 
 72. See AMI, 760 F.3d at 21. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. at 22. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol69/iss3/5
2017]       NOTE 529 
 
 
company’s] constitutionally protected interest in not providing any 
particular factual information in [its] advertising is minimal.”75 The D.C. 
Circuit Court in AMI followed its analysis by expressly overruling any 
cases within its circuit that could be interpreted to hold that Zauderer is 
limited to cases in which the justifying government interest is consumer 
deception.76  
In short, under AMI’s reformulated and clarified version of the Zauderer 
standard, any government-compelled commercial disclosure of “purely 
factual and uncontroversial information” renders the speaker’s interest in 
withholding such information “minimal.”77 
B. Petition for Rehearing Granted 
AMI’s restated rule cast doubt upon whether Zauderer’s rational basis 
standard should apply to the Conflict Minerals Rule,78 just as Judge 
Srinivasan predicted in his dissent to the court of appeals’ prior ruling.79 
After AMI decided that Zauderer could, in fact, be extended beyond the 
consumer deception context, the D.C. Circuit Court granted the SEC’s 
petition for rehearing in order to determine whether AMI’s formulation of 
the Zauderer standard had any effect on its ruling in NAM II.80 Specifically, 
the NAM III court sought to decide whether AMI’s broad holding “reaches 
compelled disclosures that are unconnected to advertising or product 
labeling at the point of sale.”81 
Even though the AMI court ruled—in direct contrast to what the court of 
appeals decided in NAM II—that the considerably more lenient Zauderer 
standard could apply outside the context of preventing consumer deception, 
that small window of hope was again quashed by the court of appeals on 
rehearing.82 The court held that requiring manufacturers dealing in conflict 
minerals to publish on their websites whether their conflict minerals are 
“DRC conflict free” violated the First Amendment.83 
                                                                                                                 
 75. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 
626, 651 (1984) (citation omitted). 
 76. AMI, 760 F.3d at 22. 
 77. Id. at 22–23 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651). 
 78. NAM III, 800 F.3d 518, 519–20 (D.C. Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc denied, No. 13-
5252 (Nov. 9, 2015). 
 79. NAM II, 748 F.3d 359, 373 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Srinivasan, J., concurring in part), 
overruled by AMI, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 80. NAM III, 800 F.3d at 520-21. 
 81. Id. at 522. 
 82. See id. at 520–21. 
 83. Id. at 521–24. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
530 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:519 
 
 
C. After AMI: The Court Again Finds that the Conflict Minerals Rule 
Violates the First Amendment 
After a second round of considering the Manufacturers’ challenge to the 
SEC’s Conflict Minerals Rule, the D.C. Court of Appeals upheld its prior 
ruling, albeit for slightly different reasons. The court again refused to apply 
the Zauderer standard to the Conflicts Mineral Rule.84 Although AMI 
allows applying rational basis review outside the context of consumer 
deception, the NAM III court found that the Zauderer standard is confined 
to advertising, “emphatically and, one may infer, intentionally.”85 The court 
emphasized Zauderer’s language that AMI relied upon, holding that “[the 
advertiser's] constitutionally protected interest in not providing any 
particular factual information in his advertising is minimal.”86 In justifying 
its position, the court cited several Supreme Court decisions in which the 
Court likewise refused to apply Zauderer outside the context of voluntary 
advertising.87 In application to the Conflict Minerals Rule, the court found 
that the required publishing of SEC disclosure material is not within the 
purview of even the broadened Zauderer standard. The court relied upon 
the SEC’s language in its Final Conflict Minerals Rule, which stated that 
the disclosure regime “[was] ‘directed at achieving overall social benefits,’ 
that the law was not ‘intended to generate measurable, direct economic 
benefits to investors or issuers,’ and that the regulatory requirements were 
‘quite different from the economic or investor protection benefits that our 
rules ordinarily strive to achieve.’”88 The court of appeals interpreted this 
language as a concession from the SEC that the case is unrelated to 
advertising or point of sale disclosures.89 
Because the court of appeals decided that Zauderer did not apply to this 
case, Central Hudson would be the proper standard to follow. However, 
instead of renewing its analysis into whether the Conflict Minerals Rule 
withstands Central Hudson, the court quickly and simply repeated the 
reasoning it articulated prior to rehearing, that “the SEC's ‘final rule does 
                                                                                                                 
 84. Id. at 523–24. 
 85. Id. at 522. 
 86. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 
626, 651 (1984) (second emphasis added). 
 87. NAM III, 800 F.3d at 522–23.  
 88. Id. at 522 (quoting Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,350 (Sept. 12, 2012) 
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, & 249b)). 
 89. Id. at 522. 
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not survive even Central Hudson's intermediate standard.’”90 The Rule was 
thus found to be an unconstitutional violation of companies’ First 
Amendment rights.91 
However, because the court of appeals was sensitive to the “flux and 
uncertainty of the First Amendment doctrine of commercial speech,” the 
court decided to buttress its holding with an alternate ground for finding 
that the Conflict Minerals Rule violates the First Amendment.92 The court 
stated that “[e]ven if the compelled disclosures here are commercial speech 
and even if AMI's view of Zauderer governed the analysis, we still believe 
that the statute and the regulations violate the First Amendment.”93 The 
court enunciated that the first step in evaluating the constitutional validity 
of compelled commercial disclosures is to evaluate the adequacy of the 
governmental interest motivating the rule.94 The court summarily accepted 
the SEC’s stated objective of “ameliorat[ing] the humanitarian crisis in the 
DRC,” and moved on to the second step of AMI’s test: evaluating the 
effectiveness of the government’s measure in achieving the interest.95 In 
reviewing efficacy of congressional initiatives, particularly in the arena of 
foreign relations, courts recognize that the political branches possess a 
greater degree of expertise and understanding on such matters, requiring 
courts to allow a degree of deference to the judgment of Congress.96 Based 
on this reality, in the area of foreign relations, courts’ “conclusions must 
often be based on informed judgment rather than concrete evidence.”97 
Although the court in this case accepted that mere evidence of the 
government’s reasoning and judgment could demonstrate this efficacy, it 
found that the SEC’s efficacy argument did not even rise above the level of 
“speculation or conjecture.”98 The court found the SEC’s argument purely 
speculative despite the fact that the SEC produced statements by multiple 
members of Congress and the executive branch, evidence of congressional 
                                                                                                                 
 90. Id. at 524 (quoting NAM II, 748 F.3d 359, 372 (D.C. Cir. 2014), overruled by AMI, 
760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014)). 
 91. See id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 524–26 (alteration in original) (quoting Brief for Appellee at 26, NAM III, 800 
F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (No. 13-5252)). 
 96. Id. at 525; see also Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 33–36 (2010).  
 97. NAM III, 800 F.3d at 525 (quoting Holder, 561 U.S. at 34–35). 
 98. Id. at 525–26. 
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hearings on the subject, and a United Nations Resolution.99 The court 
summarily found this evidence insufficient, and bolstered its finding with 
evidence collected after the Conflict Minerals Rule was enacted, suggesting 
that the implementation of section 1502 may cause unintended aggravating 
effects on the humanitarian crisis in the DRC.100 Ultimately, the court 
decided that even though the SEC’s stated government interest passed 
intermediate scrutiny, the SEC failed to prove the efficacy of the measure to 
the degree required under the First Amendment to compel speech.101 
Although the court decided that the SEC’s failure to demonstrate that the 
Conflict Minerals Rule would in fact alleviate the DRC crisis alone would 
doom the rule to unconstitutionality, the court chose to further find that, if it 
were to continue its analysis under AMI’s test, the Conflict Minerals Rule 
would again fail because the compelled disclosures do not represent “purely 
factual and uncontroversial" information.102 The court recognized that the 
AMI court “made no attempt to define those terms precisely.”103 Despite its 
uncertainty as to what “uncontroversial” could mean as it relates to 
commercial disclosures, the court simply quoted its own language from its 
prior ruling in deciding that “the description at issue—whether a product is 
‘conflict free’ or ‘not conflict free’—was hardly ‘factual and non-
ideological.’”104 The court went on to say: “We put it this way: ‘Products 
and minerals do not fight conflicts. The label “[not] conflict free” is a 
metaphor that conveys moral responsibility for the Congo war. It requires 
an issuer to tell consumers that its products are ethically tainted, even if 
they only indirectly finance armed groups.’”105 
The D.C. Circuit Court essentially rested its decision that the Conflict 
Minerals Rule’s requirement that companies publish on their websites 
whether or not their conflict minerals have been found to be “DRC conflict 
free” violates the First Amendment on two findings: (1) section 1502 and 
the Conflicts Mineral Rule were not supported by sufficient empirical 
                                                                                                                 
 99. Id.; see also Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993) (explaining that, in 
justifying a restriction on commercial speech, the government cannot rest on “mere 
speculation or conjecture”). 
 100. NAM III, 800 F.3d at 526. 
 101. Id. at 527. 
 102. Id. at 527–30 (quoting AMI, 760 F.3d 18, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2014)). 
 103. Id. at 528 (quoting Supplemental Brief for Intervenors at 9, NAM III, 800 F.3d 518 
(D.C. Cir. 2015) (No. 13-5252)). 
 104. Id. at 530 (quoting NAM II, 748 F.3d 359, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2014)). 
 105. Id. (quoting NAM II, 748 F.3d at 371). 
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evidence of efficacy in achieving its goal, and (2) the required disclosure 
does not constitute factual, uncontroversial information.106 
The dissent also engaged in a full analysis of the NAM III case, but came 
to differing conclusions at several key junctures. First, the dissent would 
have found that the relaxed Zauderer standard applied to section 1502 and 
the Conflict Minerals Rule.107 Upon finding no indication in Zauderer or 
the Supreme Court decisions following Zauderer that the relaxed standard 
was meant to only apply in advertising and product labels,108 the dissent 
concluded that Zauderer rightfully applies to compelled government 
disclosure of purely factual and uncontroversial information.109 The dissent 
then took up the task of interpreting the proper meaning of “purely factual 
and uncontroversial” from the AMI decision, and was careful to note that 
the phrase “comes from a judicial opinion, not a statute. And the ‘language 
of an opinion is not always to be parsed as though we were dealing with 
language of a statute.’”110 The dissent ultimately found that the labels 
“DRC conflict free” or “not been found to be 'DRC conflict free'” are 
merely terms of art defined by statute that do nothing more than convey 
factual information about a particular product’s source.111 The additional 
fact that the Rule allows companies the flexibility to explain the context and 
meaning of the term on their websites makes it unlikely that consumers 
would be misled into believing that the company had essentially 
“confess[ed] blood on its hands,”112 as the majority argued. Thus, in the 
dissent’s view, section 1502 and the Conflict Minerals Rule would properly 
fall under the purview of the lax Zauderer standard and pass constitutional 
scrutiny.113 
However, perhaps following the majority’s lead, the dissent refused to 
stop its analysis here; the dissent went on to argue that even if the more 
demanding Central Hudson test were to apply in this case, section 1502 and 
the Conflict Minerals Rule would still pass constitutional muster.114 
Because the parties were in general agreement that promoting peace and 
security in the DRC region qualifies as a substantial interest,115 the dissent 
                                                                                                                 
 106. Id. at 526, 530. 
 107. Id. at 534–36 (Srinivasan, J., dissenting). 
 108. Id. at 536. 
 109. Id. at 537. 
 110. Id. (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 341 (1979)). 
 111. Id. at 538–39. 
 112. Id. at 540. 
 113. Id. at 541.  
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 542. 
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went on to find that there was ample evidence to support the conclusion that 
section 1502 and the Conflict Minerals Rule reasonably further the SEC’s 
aims.116 The dissent reemphasized that because “[p]redictive judgments 
about matters such as the overseas trade in conflict minerals lie uniquely 
within the expertise of Congress and the Executive,” the Supreme Court 
“stressed the need to respect such judgments.”117 It was inappropriate for 
the majority to rely on post hoc evidence tending to disprove the efficacy of 
the Rule, because the proper frame of reference for deciding a statute’s 
constitutionality ought to relate to the time when the statute was passed. 
The dissent states:  
Whatever may be the actual effect of the statute and Rule—
including the possibility that they may have had unanticipated 
consequences—their constitutionality would not turn on a post 
hoc referendum on their effectiveness at a particular point in 
time. Otherwise, a law's constitutionality might wax and wane 
depending on the precise time when its validity is assessed.118 
NAM III was wrongly decided. The dissent aptly notes all of the 
weaknesses in the majority’s decision, and each of these weaknesses prove 
fatal to the holding that the Conflict Minerals Rule violates the First 
Amendment. The decision creates a chilling effect on corporate 
transparency and contributes further to the already widespread uncertainty 
surrounding compelled commercial speech.  
IV. Why the National Association of Manufacturers Case 
Was Wrongly Decided  
A. Importance of the National Association of Manufacturers Decision  
The NAM III decision will have a major effect on consumers, 
manufacturers, and regulatory disclosure schemes as a whole. Consumers 
are increasingly demanding corporate transparency,119 and this decision 
                                                                                                                 
 116. Id. at 543–44. 
 117. Id. at 544. 
 118. Id. at 545. 
 119. See NIELSEN, DOING WELL BY DOING GOOD: INCREASINGLY, CONSUMERS CARE 
ABOUT CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, BUT DOES CONCERN CONVERT TO 
CONSUMPTION? 5 (June 2014), http://www.nielsen.com/content/dam/nielsenglobal/jp/docs/ 
report/2014/Nielsen%20Global%20Corporate%20Social%20Responsibility%20Report%20-
%20June%202014.pdf; see also American Consumers Take Sustainability to the Next Level, 
TORK (Sept. 23, 2015), https://www.torkusa.com/about/press-releases/news-detail?id=10863 
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presents a major obstacle for consumers’ ability to gather information about 
their products. Consumer perception of a company’s transparency has been 
linked to willingness to purchase that company’s product and to spread 
positive opinions about the company.120 A recent study shows that fifty-five 
percent of consumers are willing to pay more money for sustainable 
products.121 Perhaps unsurprisingly, sixty percent of those consumers are 
under thirty-four years old,122 demonstrating that this trend is only likely to 
continue growing. Increased access to information allows consumers and 
investors to put pressure on companies to make ethical sourcing decisions. 
The Conflict Minerals Rule allows consumers to decide for themselves 
whether they want to participate in financing the atrocities in the DRC. 
Beyond the consumer interest in access to product information, the 
United States is committed to holding its companies to a high standard of 
corporate transparency, and the NAM III ruling stands in plain contradiction 
to U.S. policy on the topic of business and human rights. In 2013, the U.S. 
Department of State published a document titled U.S. Government 
Approach to Business and Human Rights.123 The document expressly 
endorses the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,124 
which encourage companies to engage in extensive due diligence activities 
and to report the outcomes of those activities on their public websites.125 In 
this 2013 guidance, the government clarified that the UN Guiding 
Principles are meant to be understood as the base level of responsibility and 
transparency that U.S. companies are expected to practice, and encouraged 
U.S. companies to strive beyond the recommendations of the UN Guiding 
                                                                                                                 
(stating that seventy-eight percent of consumers said they purchase sustainable products, 
compared to seventy-five percent in 2014). 
 120. Jiyun Kang & Gwendolyn Hustvedt, Building Trust Between Consumers and 
Corporations: The Role of Consumer Perceptions of Transparency and Social 
Responsibility, 125 J. BUS. ETHICS 253, 262 (2013). 
 121. NIELSEN, supra note 119, at 5. 
 122. Id. at 8. 
 123. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, U.S. 
GOVERNMENT APPROACH ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2013), https://www. 
humanrights.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/usg-approach-on-business-and-human-rights-
updatedjune2013.pdf [hereinafter U.S. GOVERNMENT APPROACH ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS]. 
 124. Id. at 3–5. 
 125. John Ruggie (Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General), Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, 
Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. DocA/HRC/17/31, at 17-18, 20 (Mar. 21, 2011).  
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Principles.126 In further commitment to this goal of corporate responsibility, 
the U.S. government is currently in the process of developing a National 
Action Plan on Responsible Business Conduct.127 The National Action Plan 
is centered upon the effort “to promote and incentivize responsible business 
conduct . . . with respect to transparency.”128 U.S. government policy is 
clearly trending toward increased corporate transparency and disclosure. 
The NAM III ruling protecting companies’ ability to withhold the results of 
the due diligence efforts already required by the government presents a 
major obstruction in the operation of U.S. policy on business and human 
rights.  
On a practical level, the D.C. Circuit Court’s ruling means that the 
commercial disclosures required of manufacturers in some states may be 
reviewed under different standards than those used for manufacturers in 
others.129 Circuit courts continue to grapple with when to apply the 
Zauderer standard, and what standard to apply if the court finds the 
Zauderer standard inapplicable, creating a circuit split on how to review 
compelled commercial speech.130 While the Second Circuit is willing to 
apply the relaxed Zauderer standard even when the prevention of consumer 
deception is not at issue,131 the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have held that, 
when the case does not fit into the Zauderer exception, the court is to apply 
strict scrutiny.132 NAM III has added even greater uncertainty to the already 
vague arena of compelled disclosures, producing a nearly impenetrable 
minefield of law under which manufacturers must operate.  
                                                                                                                 
 126. U.S. GOVERNMENT APPROACH ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 123, at 
4. 
 127. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec'y, Fact Sheet: The U.S. Global 
Anticorruption Agenda (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/ 
09/24/fact-sheet-us-global-anticorruption-agenda.  
 128. Id. 
 129. See Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 559 n.8 (6th 
Cir. 2012); Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 652 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 130. Joshua A. Feinzeig, Promoting World Peace Through the Use of the “Good Book”: 
Implementing Foreign Policy Through the Tax Code, 40 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 953, 972–73 
(2015). 
 131. Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 132. Disc. Tobacco City, 674 F.3d at 554 (“If a commercial-speech disclosure 
requirement fits within the framework of Zauderer and its progeny, then we apply a rational-
basis standard. If it does not, then we treat the disclosure as compelled speech under Wooley 
v. Maynard and its ilk and apply strict scrutiny.” (citations omitted)); Entm’t Software Ass’n, 
469 F.3d at 651-52 (applying strict scrutiny when video labeling requirements were found 
outside to be outside of the Zauderer exception). 
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Further, this decision casts doubt on a number of other long-accepted 
disclosure regimes across industries.133 Employers must notify employees 
of potential workplace hazards.134 Automobile manufacturers must provide 
labels for their cars containing information on fuel consumption and 
greenhouse gas emissions.135 Health care providers must inform patients of 
their privacy rights.136 Mortgage brokers must make disclosures regarding 
loan terms and fees to borrowers.137 Home lenders must make public 
information regarding the race, national origin, sex, and incomes of 
applicants and actual borrowers.138 Credit companies are required to 
disclose information about card rates, fees, and balances to cardholders.139 
Because none of these disclosures involve advertising or point of sale 
disclosures, the NAM III court would review their constitutional legitimacy 
under the Central Hudson standard.140 The Central Hudson test, though 
labeled as intermediate scrutiny, has been applied with such vigor that no 
government restriction of commercial speech has survived its review in 
over two decades.141  
The implications of the NAM III decision are severe, both on consumer 
interests and U.S. policy, as well as on the current regulatory disclosure 
regime.  
B. The D.C. Circuit Court’s Flawed Analysis 
The NAM III majority rested its decision on three findings—each of 
which are inadequate. First, the court found that Zauderer is limited to 
voluntary advertising or point of purchase sales, despite scant evidence that 
the Zauderer Court intended such a narrow interpretation of its rule. 
Second, the court decided that the government’s inability to prove that the 
Rule would actually alleviate the DRC crisis doomed section 1502 and the 
Conflict Minerals Rule to unconstitutionality. Finally, the court did not find 
                                                                                                                 
 133. Brief of Amici Curiae Tobacco Control Legal Consortium et al. in Support of 
Appellees' Petitions for Rehearing En Banc at 2–3, NAM III, 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
(No. 13-5252), 2015 WL 5996680. 
 134. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(7) (2012). 
 135. See 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600 (2015). 
 136. See 45 id. § 164.520. 
 137. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2606 (2012). 
 138. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2810 (2012). 
 139. See 15 U.S.C. § 1637a (2012).  
 140. See NAM III, 800 F.3d 518, 521–24 (D.C. Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc denied, No. 13-
5252 (Nov. 9, 2015).  
 141. Seth E. Mermin & Samantha K. Graff, The First Amendment and Public Health, at 
Odds, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 298, 299 n.12 (2013).  
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the labels “DRC conflict free” and “not been found to be DRC conflict 
free” to convey purely factual and uncontroversial information. 
1. Zauderer Is Not Limited to Voluntary Advertising 
The NAM III court rested its holding upon a clear limitation of the 
Zauderer standard to instances of voluntary advertising or point of sale 
disclosures.142 This limitation, however, conflicts both with the Zauderer 
Court’s core rationale as well as with the interpretations of other circuit 
courts.143  
Zauderer expressly presents itself as a decision on commercial speech.144 
The Zauderer Court placed a lax standard of constitutional review on 
commercial speech because a company has a minimal interest in 
withholding factual information about its products when weighed against 
the value such disclosure provides consumers.145 This stated reasoning for 
slackening the level of review is hardly unique to the advertising context; a 
company’s interest in withholding valuable information from its consumers 
should be found minimal irrespective of how the disclosure presents itself. 
The majority relied heavily on quotations from Zauderer using the word 
“advertising,”146 but the majority fails to acknowledge that the use of the 
word is attributable more to the specific factual scenario of Zauderer 
(upholding a state requirement that attorneys’ advertising services must 
provide certain disclosures about fees to potential clients) than to any 
intentional limitation on the Zauderer Court’s part to the context of 
voluntary advertising.147 
This reading of Zauderer’s holding is shared by at least one other circuit 
court, and has never been refuted by the Supreme Court.148 In United States 
v. Wenger, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld a requirement 
compelling radio program hosts to disclose information about payments 
made to encourage certain opinions, in the interest of providing listeners 
with knowledge of whether the hosts’ statements are truly disinterested.149 
This kind of disclosure is hardly related to advertising and certainly has 
                                                                                                                 
 142. See NAM III, 800 F.3d at 521–22. 
 143. Id. at 535 (Srinivasan, J., dissenting). 
 144. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 
626, 637 (1985). 
 145. Id. at 650–53. 
 146. NAM III, 800 F.3d at 522. 
 147. See id. at 536 (Srinivasan, J., dissenting). 
 148. United States v. Wenger, 427 F.3d 840, 849 (10th Cir. 2005); see NAM III, 800 F.3d 
at 535 (Srinivasan, J., dissenting). 
 149. 427 F.3d at 850–51. 
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nothing to do with point of sale disclosures. The Supreme Court has also 
never intimated that such a limitation would be warranted in its post-
Zauderer decisions on commercial speech.150 
Moreover, the majority’s limitation of relaxed scrutiny to commercial 
advertising yields incongruous results. As Judge Srinivasan appropriately 
notes in his dissent, if the Conflict Minerals Rule had required 
manufacturers to place prominent labels regarding country of origin directly 
onto their products, the majority would review such point of sale 
disclosures under rational basis.151 Yet when that same disclosure is 
required to be placed once yearly on the company’s website, explained by 
any contextualizing information the company may choose to include, a 
more demanding standard of review would be necessary.152 Why should a 
periodic internet post be more harshly scrutinized than a prominent product 
label? This result is especially illogical considering that, when presented 
with the choice, most manufacturers would almost certainly favor an 
internet posting over product label disclosures. The majority opinion does 
little to assuage its holding’s discordant consequences, further suggesting 
that the majority framework should not stand. 
2. The Government Is Not Required to Prove Actual Effectiveness of the 
Conflict Minerals Rule 
The NAM III court’s alternate holding, that, even under rational basis 
scrutiny, the SEC failed to demonstrate the actual effectiveness of the 
Conflict Minerals Rule, is equally as flawed as its first holding. The court 
demanded much stronger proof of efficacy than is actually required, failed 
to adequately defer to the executive branch’s judgment in foreign relations, 
inappropriately relied on post-hoc evidence, and created an efficacy 
standard that would topple some of the most widely accepted disclosure 
regimes.  
                                                                                                                 
 150. The majority cites a number of cases to prove that the Supreme Court would 
approve of an advertising limit. See NAM III, 800 F.3d at 523. However, these cases were 
merely restating the holding of Zauderer, not expressing an intent to limit the scope of 
Zauderer’s holding. See Hurley v. Irish–Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 
U.S. 557, 573 (1995) (quoting Zauderer's observation that the government may at times 
“prescribe what shall be orthodox in commercial advertising” in a case not involving 
commercial speech (citation omitted)); United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 
416 (2001) (reciting the holding of Zauderer upon its facts, but giving no indication that 
Zauderer was meant to be confined to the advertising context). 
 151. See NAM III, 800 F.3d at 535 (Srinivasan, J., dissenting). 
 152. See id.  
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The court overstated the level of proof required under the second prong 
of Zauderer constitutional scrutiny. The majority claimed to be following 
AMI’s formulation of the Zauderer standard, under which the court 
evaluates the effectiveness of the measure in achieving its goal. However, 
the AMI court actually evaluated effectiveness very loosely; the court stated 
that actual evidence of a regulation’s effectiveness is not required, 
reasoning that “such evidentiary parsing is hardly necessary when the 
government uses a disclosure mandate to achieve a goal of informing 
consumers about a particular product trait, assuming of course that the 
reason for informing consumers qualifies as an adequate interest.”153 AMI 
went so far as to say that a reasonably crafted government mandate to 
disclose certain facts about attributes of a company’s product “will almost 
always demonstrate a reasonable means-ends relationship.”154 The NAM III 
majority, however, made no attempt to differentiate between a country of 
origin label for meat products that will always satisfy rational basis 
scrutiny, and a country of origin website posting for electronic products that 
the court deemed to fail rational basis scrutiny on this count.155  
Beyond the AMI context, cases in the field of foreign relations call for an 
even lower standard for demonstrating effectiveness, as the court is to defer 
to the executive branch’s judgment regarding the effectiveness of a 
particular rule.156 Given the courts’ lack of expertise in foreign affairs, and 
the difficulty with which the effectiveness of foreign affairs measures can 
be evaluated, courts’ “conclusions must often be based on informed 
judgment rather than concrete evidence.”157 While the NAM III majority 
gave lip service to the Supreme Court precedent mandating deference to the 
executive branch’s factual conclusions, the court quickly dismissed the 
SEC’s proffered conclusions as “rest[ing] on pure speculation,” and 
creating “evidentiary gaps.”158  
                                                                                                                 
 153. AMI, 760 F.3d 18, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 650 (1985)). 
 154. Id.  
 155. NAM III, 800 F.3d at 524–27. 
 156. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 33-36 (2010). 
 157. Id. at 34-35; see Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 62 (1973); United 
States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 626 (1954) (making no inquiry into whether the legislative 
record supported the determination that the regulation would be effective); Nat’l Ass’n of 
Mfrs. v. Taylor, 582 F.3d 1, 15–16 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (allowing a “value judgment based on 
the common sense of the people's representatives” to support required disclosure of 
contributions to lobbying activities). 
 158. NAM III, 800 F.3d at 525. 
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The importance of reducing funding to the armed conflict in the DRC 
has long been a source of concern, both in the U.S. and internationally.159 
The SEC provided citations to multiple sources bolstering its conclusion 
that reducing funding to armed groups would promote peace and security in 
the DRC.160 Under scrutiny that has demanded no actual evidence of 
effectiveness,161 and given the deference accorded in the realm of foreign 
relations,162 the government’s evidence of its rational, factual conclusion 
that section 1502 would serve its purpose should have more than satisfied 
the extremely low burden for demonstrating efficacy.  
Further, the majority’s attempt to bolster its determination that the 
Conflict Minerals Rule is ineffective with evidence that its enactment has 
had unintended consequences is entirely misplaced. With regard to whether 
Congress adequately determined that its rule would be effective at 
promoting its goal, evidence of unintended effects of the rule after its 
passing is wholly irrelevant. As Judge Srinivasan noted, ”[o]therwise, a 
law's constitutionality might wax and wane depending on the precise time 
when its validity is assessed.”163 The majority’s evidence also fails to tell 
the whole story; in addition to the reports of section 1502’s unintended 
consequences, other reports exist proclaiming that the rule has actually had 
a hugely successful impact on the ground.164 While evidence of later-in-
time ineffectiveness may be successful in tarnishing the reputation of 
section 1502, it provides no insight into the constitutionality of the rule at 
the time it was passed.  
                                                                                                                 
 159. See 155 CONG. REC. S4697-98 (daily ed. Apr. 23, 2009) (statement of Sen. 
Feingold); S.C. Res. 1376, ¶ 8 (Nov. 9, 2001) (stressing that “the natural resources of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo should not be exploited to finance the conflict in that 
country”); Karen E. Woody, Securities Laws as Foreign Policy, 15 NEV. L.J. 297, 315–17 
(2014). 
 160. See 156 CONG. REC. S3976 (daily ed. May 19, 2010) (statement of Sen. Feingold) 
(accepting the UN’s determination that militant groups are able to finance themselves by 
controlling mines and trade routes and referring to section 1502 as “a significant, practical 
step toward” addressing the underlying cause of the conflict); 156 CONG. REC. S3817 (daily 
ed. May 17, 2010) (statement of Sen. Durbin); 155 CONG. REC. S4697-98 (daily ed. Apr. 23, 
2009) (statement of Sen. Feingold); Press Statement, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, 
Conflict Minerals in the Democratic Republic of Congo 2010/994 (July 22, 2010), 
https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/07/145039.htm. 
 161. AMI, 760 F.3d 18, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 162. Holder, 561 U.S. at 33-35. 
 163. NAM III, 800 F.3d at 545 (Srinivasan, J., dissenting). 
 164. Nicholas Webb et al., Conflict Minerals and the Law, BENCH & B. MINN., Jan. 2015, 
at 26, 28–29 (providing evidence that Dodd-Frank Section 1502 has had a hugely successful 
impact upon ameliorating the situation in the DRC). 
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Finally, the level of effectiveness required by the majority raises the 
standard for proof-of-effectiveness above what even the most commonplace 
disclosures can provide. The amicus brief filed by the Tobacco Control 
Legal Consortium and numerous other organizations argues that mandated 
warnings regarding allergens in food, safety of children’s toys, and side 
effects of prescription drugs would almost certainly fail to “survive a 
similar ex ante demand for proof of effectiveness.”165 In the face of 
precedent suggesting that little to no evidence should be required,166 the 
majority essentially required proof of actual effectiveness of the SEC’s 
rule, creating an untenable standard under which even the most basic 
disclosure requirements would fall. 
3. The Conflict Minerals Rule’s Labels Constitute Purely Factual and 
Uncontroversial Information 
The NAM III majority’s final blow to the Conflict Minerals Rule—that 
the disclosures required do not represent purely factual or uncontroversial 
information—can also be negated. Even though the majority engaged in 
some discussion as to the actual requirements of Zauderer’s “purely factual 
and uncontroversial” holding, the court ultimately leaned on its prior 
decision that the disclosures are “hardly ‘factual and non-ideological,’” in 
that they “compel[] an issuer to confess blood on its hands.”167  
The Conflict Minerals Rule’s label “DRC conflict free” does not require 
companies to confess blood on their hands, as the phrase is merely a 
statutorily defined term of art. Section 1502 defines “DRC conflict free” to 
mean that the reporting company’s necessary minerals do not directly or 
indirectly finance or benefit armed groups in the DRC or an adjoining 
country.168 It is difficult to see how this factual information regarding 
conflict sourcing could be materially different from those sourcing 
disclosures required in AMI; as the dissent notes, “[i]f geographic 
information about the sourcing of meat products qualifies as ‘purely factual 
and uncontroversial,’ as we held in AMI, so, too, does geographic 
information about the sourcing of a product's component minerals.”169 It is 
highly unlikely that these disclosures would mislead consumers, especially 
                                                                                                                 
 165. Brief of Amici Curiae Tobacco Control Legal Consortium et al. In Support of 
Appellees' Petition for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 133, at 5. 
 166. See AMI, 760 F.3d at 26; Holder, 561 U.S. at 34-35.  
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considering the fact that companies are allowed to surround their disclosure 
with any contextualizing information they deem fit.170 
A recent study shows that the vast majority of consumers find section 
1502’s conflict minerals labels to convey purely factual information. This 
survey found that eighty-six percent of consumers polled thought that the 
conflict minerals disclosures to convey purely factual information.171  This 
margin is strikingly close to the ninety-seven percent of consumers who 
believed that country of origin product labeling—of the type that passed 
AMI scrutiny with ease—to be purely factual.172 If the major concern is that 
the label “not been found to be ‘DRC conflict free’” will mislead 
consumers into believing a company has moral culpability for the DRC 
crisis,173 this information demonstrates that such fears are largely 
unwarranted. 
Because the Conflict Minerals Rule’s labels are statutorily defined terms 
of art, presented within the context of the company’s explanation of their 
meaning, and because consumers actually believe the disclosures to convey 
factual information, the majority’s conclusory statement that these 
disclosures “compel[] an issuer to confess blood on its hands”174 cannot 
stand. 
V. Conclusion 
As the purchaser of a brand new smartphone, are you satisfied with the 
conclusion of the NAM III court? Does it make sense to you that the product 
labeling of the meat you purchase will be scrutinized less harshly than the 
websites you view in your search for reliable information? The D.C. Circuit 
Court has presented a major step backward in the ever-growing trend of 
corporate transparency. The court improperly limited the scope of rational 
basis review of commercial speech, it overstated the level of effectiveness 
the government is required to prove in matters of foreign affairs, and it 
deemed the Conflict Minerals Rule’s disclosures “hardly” factual and 
uncontroversial with a brief conclusory statement. Each of these mistakes 
led the court to exacerbate an already unsound legal scheme that puts the 
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review of disclosure regimes across industries in question. These missteps 
doom the decision to unconstitutionality. 
The confounding narrative over levels of scrutiny, compelled 
commercial speech, and the Conflict Minerals Rule only distracts from the 
true purpose of these disclosures: to help alleviate the humanitarian crisis in 
the DRC by encouraging U.S. companies to abstain from indirectly funding 
militant groups. Outside of the legal battle, thousands of miles away, the 
crisis still rages on in the DRC, and U.S. consumers deserve to know 
whether or not they are contributing to its perpetuation. 
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